Loading
Loading

president at Minneapolis (9) · where the Board comes from
Mar 21, 1985 – Sep 1, 2009
Economist · Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Terminal: PhD · economics
Mr. Stern dissented because he believed that a modestly more restrictive policy was appropriate. In his view, historical precedents suggested that prolonged periods of taut labor markets were eventually associated with rising inflation. Given prevailing pressures on resources, especially labor, Mr. Stern was concerned about the distinct risk of an acceleration of inflation. Should this acceleration occur, he believed it would prove disruptive to the favorable performance of the economy, and he preferred to begin to address this risk promptly. Return to top Amendment to Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations At this meeting the Committee considered a proposal to replace the existing 12-month maturity limit on the investment of foreign currency balances with an 18-month average duration limit. The proposal was designed to allow the Manager a wider choice of maturities and hence somewhat greater operational flexibility in the implementation of the System's primary portfolio objectives of liquidity with respect to investments in foreign government securities and limits on overall interest rate and credit risks.
Mr. Stern dissented because he believed that policy should become modestly more restrictive. He was concerned that, in the absence of a substantial and sustained improvement in productivity, the prevailing pattern of demand might engender an increase in inflationary pressures, and that such pressures would ultimately threaten the ongoing economic expansion. In Mr. Stern's judgment, it was prudent at this point to resist such a development in order to lay a foundation for the long-term health of the economy.
Mr. Stern dissented because he was convinced that a modestly more restrictive policy was warranted. In his view, the momentum of the economy and strains on capacity in labor and some other markets raised the possibility of an acceleration of inflation that would jeopardize the economic expansion. This concern aside, Mr. Stern also believed that current circumstances were favorable for policy action to reduce inflation further and thereby help to sustain the ongoing improvement in the economy. As a prelude to its formal review later in the year, the Committee at this meeting considered its existing network of swap arrangements with a number of foreign central banks and the Bank for International Settlements. From time to time in recent years, the Committee had discussed a variety of issues relating to its foreign exchange activities and its financial arrangements with other central banks. In this discusssion, the Committee considered in particular whether the swap arrangements, all of which had been put in place in the 1960s, remained an appropriate approach to international financial cooperation among central banks in light of the evolution of the international financial system in recent decades, and whether other approaches should be considered. The Committee made no decisions relating to these matters, though it was understood that these issues would be explored further.