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president at St. Louis (8) · where the Board comes from
Mar 23, 1998 – Mar 31, 2008
Professor · Brown University
Terminal: PhD · economics
Mr. Poole dissented because he believed that FOMC actions this year had already established a highly stimulative monetary policy stance. The M2 and MZM measures of money had risen at annual rates in excess of 10 percent and 20 percent respectively over the past six months, and the real federal funds rate was very likely below its equilibrium level. Other more qualitative information on financial conditions pointed in the same direction. Economic forecasts were that the economy's growth would resume later this year and the fact that long-term interest rates had not declined since December also indicated that the market anticipated a revival of faster economic growth before long. Given the lags in monetary processes, he believed that adding further monetary policy stimulus raised an undue risk of fostering higher inflation in the future. Moreover, against this background, he was especially concerned that a statement that the Committee continued to view the balance of risks as weighted toward weakness would be read in the market as a sign that the Committee was likely to ease further in the near term. He thought future developments were equally likely to warrant an action in either direction, and he did not think the Committee should take a step that probably would cause expectations of further easing to become embedded in market interest rates.
Mr. Poole dissented because he believed that the sustained increase in money growth in recent quarters and associated accommodative conditions in the credit markets pointed to rising inflation. Although faster productivity growth suggested that trend output growth might be modestly higher than previously thought, the growth rate of aggregate demand over the past two years clearly had exceeded the economy's long-run growth potential. Without a reduction of aggregate demand growth, inflation would rise. In his view, the Federal Reserve should therefore take prompt action to reduce money growth to limit the rise in inflation and to avoid an increase in longer-term inflation expectations, which would tend to destabilize aggregate employment and financial markets.