Thomas M. Hoenig

Mr. Hoenig dissented, emphasizing that the economy was entering the second year of moderate recovery and that, while the zero interest rate policy and "extended period" language were appropriate during the crisis and its immediate aftermath, they were no longer appropriate with the recovery under way. Mr. Hoenig also emphasized that, in his view, the current high levels of unemployment were not caused by high interest rates but by an extended period of exceptionally low rates earlier in the decade that contributed to the housing bubble and subsequent collapse and recession. He believed that holding rates artificially low would invite the development of new imbalances and undermine long-run growth. He would prefer removing the "extended period" language and thereafter moving the federal funds rate upward, consistent with his views at past meetings that it approach 1 percent, before pausing to determine what further policy actions were needed. Also, given current economic and financial conditions, Mr. Hoenig did not believe that continuing to reinvest principal payments from SOMA securities holdings was required to support the Committee's policy objectives.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he thought it was not appropriate to indicate that economic and financial conditions were "likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period" or to reinvest principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury securities. Mr. Hoenig felt that the "extended period" expectation could limit the Committee's flexibility to begin raising rates modestly in a timely fashion, and he believed that the recovery, which had entered its second year and was expected to continue at a moderate pace, did not require support from additional accommodation in monetary policy. Mr. Hoenig was also concerned that these accommodative policy positions could result in the buildup of future financial imbalances and increase the risks to longer-run macroeconomic and financial stability.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he believed that, as the economy completed its first year of modest recovery, it was no longer advisable to indicate that economic and financial conditions were likely to warrant "exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. " Although risks to the forecast remained, Mr. Hoenig was concerned that communicating such an expectation would limit the Committee's flexibility to begin raising rates modestly in a timely fashion and could result in a buildup of future financial imbalances and increase the risks to longer-run macroeconomic and financial stability.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he believed it was no longer advisable to indicate that economic and financial conditions were likely to warrant "exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. " Mr. Hoenig was concerned that communicating such an expectation could lead to the buildup of future financial imbalances and increase the risks to longer-run macroeconomic and financial stability, while limiting the Committee's flexibility to begin raising rates modestly in the near term. Mr. Hoenig believed that the target for the federal funds rate should be increased toward 1 percent this summer, and that the Committee could then pause to further assess the economic outlook. He believed this approach would leave considerable policy accommodation in place to foster an expected gradual decline in unemployment in the quarters ahead and would reduce the risk of an increase in financial imbalances and inflation pressures in coming years. It would also mitigate the need to push the policy rate to higher levels later in the expansionary phase of the economic cycle.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he believed it was no longer advisable to indicate that economic and financial conditions were likely to warrant "exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. " Mr. Hoenig was concerned that communicating such an expectation could lead to the buildup of future financial imbalances and increase the risks to longer-run macroeconomic and financial stability. Accordingly, Mr. Hoenig believed that it would be more appropriate for the Committee to express its anticipation that economic conditions were likely to warrant "a low level of the federal funds rate for some time. " Such a change in communication would provide the Committee flexibility to begin raising rates modestly. He further believed that making such an adjustment to the Committee's target for the federal funds rate sooner rather than later would reduce longer-run risks to macroeconomic and financial stability while continuing to provide needed support to the economic recovery.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he believed it was no longer advisable to indicate that economic and financial conditions were likely to "warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. " In recent months, economic and financial conditions improved steadily, and Mr. Hoenig was concerned that, under these improving conditions, maintaining short-term interest rates near zero for an extended period of time would lay the groundwork for future financial imbalances and risk an increase in inflation expectations. Accordingly, Mr. Hoenig believed that it would be more appropriate for the Committee to express an expectation that the federal funds rate would be low for some time--rather than exceptionally low for an extended period. Such a change in communication would provide the Committee flexibility to begin raising rates modestly. He further believed that moving to a modestly higher federal funds rate soon would lower the risks of longer-run imbalances and an increase in long-run inflation expectations, while continuing to provide needed support to the economic recovery.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he believed that policy should remain unchanged at this meeting. Projections for the U.S. and global economies suggested that growth was likely to proceed at a reasonable pace over the outlook period. To better assure that outcome, the FOMC had moved rates down significantly at its September meeting. At this meeting, inflation risks appeared elevated and Mr. Hoenig felt that the target federal funds rate was currently close to neutral. In these circumstances, he judged that policy needed to be slightly firm to better hold inflation in check. Going forward, if the data suggested the Committee needed to ease further, it could do so. He also recognized that liquidity remains a near-term challenge and that the Federal Reserve would be prepared to act if needed. Mr. Hoenig saw the risks to both economic growth and inflation to be elevated and preferred to wait, watch, and be ready to act depending on how events developed. The Committee then resumed its discussion of an enhanced role for the economic projections that are made periodically by the members of the Board of Governors and the Reserve Bank presidents. At this meeting, participants reached a consensus on increasing the frequency and expanding the content of the projections that in the past have been released to the public in summary form twice a year. They agreed to publish with the minutes a summary of participants� economic projections made for this meeting and to release a press statement describing the plan for the future. The release of more frequent forecasts covering longer time spans and accompanied by explanations of those forecasts was seen as providing the public with more context for understanding the Committee�s monetary policy decisions.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he preferred to leave the federal funds rate unchanged. He judged that a 2 percent federal funds rate was already quite stimulative and that a more stimulative policy was not needed. Following the rapid and aggressive policy actions already taken, it would be prudent to give the current policy more time to work through the economy. It was also his position that reducing the federal funds rate at this meeting could increase interest rate volatility by creating an expectation of a faster or a more aggressive reversal of policy.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he preferred a less aggressive easing action involving a reduction of 25 basis points in the federal funds rate. While the risks of weaker economic growth still tended to dominate those of rising inflation and called for some further easing, the Committee had added significant liquidity to the economy this year through its cumulatively large easing actions. The lagged effects of those actions should be felt increasingly over time. Moreover, following the rapid and aggressive policy actions already taken, a more cautious policy move at this point would in his view appropriately limit the risks of producing an overly accommodative policy stance and rising inflation over time. The Chairman called for a recess after this vote and convened a meeting of the Board of Governors to consider one-half percentage point reductions in the discount rate that had been proposed by a number of Federal Reserve Banks. After the recess, the Chairman informed the Committee that the pending reductions had been approved.

Mr. Hoenig dissented because he believed the stance of monetary policy should remain unchanged at this time. With the pace of economic activity likely to return to trend growth later this year and inflation expected to be higher this year and next than in 1994, he felt an unchanged policy in the near term would enhance the prospects of achieving the Committee's long-run objectives of sustainable economic growth and price stability.