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represented Richmond (5), current job · state of record Virginia · where the Board comes from
Nov 26, 1991 – Feb 5, 1997 · confirmed Nov 22, 1991 · represents the Richmond district (current job)
Professor · Harvard University
Terminal: PhD · economics
Mr. Lindsey dissented because he believed that monetary policy should be eased. The evidence suggested to him that in the absence of an easing move the underlying rate of nominal GDP growth was likely to be lower than needed to maintain real GDP at or near its potential. The intermediate forecast was subject to a number of significant risks: household balance sheets seemed unlikely to sustain the current rate of durables expenditure for any extended period; government expenditures were certain to be cut substantially; and with fiscal contractions underway in Europe and Canada and severe financial stresses present in Japan and Mexico, he did not see much likelihood of a substantial expansion of exports. In keeping with his views, the financial markets were signalling the likelihood that a weaker pace of nominal GDP growth would materialize. The yield curve was virtually flat, with government securities up through relatively long maturities trading at yields below the current average federal funds rate. Thus, markets would be unlikely to find some easing inappropriate and over the intermediate horizon would view the current level of short-term rates as unsustainable.
Messrs. Angell and Lindsey dissented because they believed that monetary policy was overly accommodative and needed to be adjusted promptly toward a more neutral stance to counter potential inflationary pressures in the economy. They referred to the long lags with which monetary policy exerts its effects on inflation and the consequent need to adjust monetary policy on a timely basis to foster the Committee's long-run objective of stable prices. They understood the difficulty of finding the appropriate circumstances for tightening actions so as to avoid unintended interpretations and repercussions in financial markets. In their judgment, economic and financial conditions were unlikely to be more favorable later and waiting risked undesirable inflationary consequences.
Messrs. Angell and Lindsey indicated that their concerns about the outlook for inflation prompted them to favor an immediate move to tighten reserve conditions. In their view, such an action was desirable not only to arrest the possible emergence of greater inflation but especially to promote further disinflation. They were persuaded that monetary policy currently was overly accommodative as suggested by various indicators such as recent data on consumer and producer prices, the upswing in commodity prices, the low level of real short-term interest rates, and what in their judgment was a relatively depressed foreign exchange value of the dollar given the comparative strength of the U.S. economy and international interest rate trends. They noted that the current federal funds rate was probably not sustainable in the long term and that a tightening move at this time might well avoid the need for more sizable and potentially disruptive policy actions later.