Jeffrey M. Lacker

Mr. Lacker dissented because he objected to the asset purchases and to the characterization of the conditions under which an exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate would remain appropriate. He continued to view asset purchases as unlikely to add to economic growth without unacceptably increasing the risk of future inflation, and to see purchases of MBS as inappropriate credit allocation. With regard to the funds rate, Mr. Lacker was concerned that linking the forward guidance to a specific numerical level of the unemployment rate would inhibit the effectiveness of the Committee's communications and increase the potential for inflationary policy errors; he preferred qualitative guidance instead.

Mr. Lacker dissented for the same reasons he had cited at the September FOMC meeting, including his view of the likely ineffectiveness of asset purchases and their potential inflationary effects, as well as the inappropriateness of credit allocation inherent in purchasing MBS. He also continued to disagree with the description of the time period over which a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy would remain appropriate and exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate were likely to be warranted. Discussion of Communications regarding Economic Projections A staff presentation reviewed the results of the consensus forecast experiments that the Committee conducted in conjunction with its August and September meetings. The briefing highlighted the important role of the assumed path for monetary policy in constructing a consensus forecast and reviewed several alternative approaches for setting such a path. As a possible alternative to a consensus forecast, the staff presentation also discussed potential enhancements to the SEP. In their discussion, participants agreed that FOMC communications could be enhanced by clarifying the linkage between participants' economic forecasts, including the underlying policy assumptions, and the Committee's policy decision as expressed in the postmeeting statement. However, most participants judged that, given the diversity of their views about the economy's structure and dynamics, it would be difficult for the Committee to agree on a fully specified longer-term path for monetary policy to incorporate into a quantitative consensus forecast in a timely manner, especially under present conditions in which the policy decision comprises several elements. Participants agreed to continue to explore ways to increase transparency and clarity in the Committee's policy communications, and they indicated a willingness to look into modifications to the SEP. At the end of the discussion, the Chairman asked the subcommittee on communications to explore potential approaches to providing more information about the Committee's collective judgment regarding the economic outlook and appropriate monetary policy through the SEP.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he believed that additional monetary stimulus at this time was unlikely to result in a discernible improvement in economic growth without also causing an unwanted increase in inflation. Moreover, he expressed his opposition to the purchase of more MBS, because he viewed it as inappropriate for the Committee to choose a particular sector of the economy to support; purchases of Treasury securities instead would have avoided this effect. Finally, he preferred to omit the description of the time period over which exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate were likely to be warranted. Consensus Forecast Experiment In light of the discussion at the previous FOMC meeting, the subcommittee on communications developed a second experimental exercise intended to shed light on the feasibility and desirability of constructing an FOMC consensus forecast. At this meeting, participants discussed possible formulations of the monetary policy assumptions on which to condition an FOMC consensus forecast and alternative approaches for participants to express their endorsement of the consensus forecast. In conclusion, participants agreed to have a broad discussion of the experiences gathered from the two experimental exercises in conjunction with the October FOMC meeting.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he did not believe that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate were likely to be warranted for the length of time specified in the Committee's statement. In his view, significant uncertainty regarding the evolution of economic conditions over the next few years made the future path of interest rates difficult to forecast, and the Committee's statement implied more confidence on this score than justified by the current outlook. Consensus Forecast Experiment In light of the discussion at the previous FOMC meeting, the subcommittee on communications developed an initial experimental exercise intended to shed light on the feasibility and desirability of constructing an FOMC consensus forecast. At this meeting, participants discussed various aspects of the exercise, such as the possible monetary policy assumptions on which to condition an FOMC consensus forecast, the measurement of the degree of uncertainty surrounding each of the projected variables in the forecast, and the potential for communications benefits. In conclusion, participants generally expressed support for a second exercise to be undertaken in conjunction with the September FOMC meeting.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he opposed continuation of the maturity extension program. He did not believe that further monetary stimulus at this time would make a substantial difference for economic growth and employment without also increasing inflation by more than would be desirable. In Mr. Lacker's view, the outlook for economic growth had clearly weakened of late, but he questioned whether the maturity extension program would have much effect in current circumstances. Should inflation fall substantially and persistently below the Committee's 2 percent goal, however, he felt that monetary stimulus might then be appropriate to ensure the return of inflation toward target.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he did not believe that economic conditions were likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate through late 2014. In his view, an increase in the federal funds rate was likely to be necessary by mid-2013 to prevent the emergence of inflationary pressures.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he did not agree that economic conditions were likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. In his view, with inflation close to the Committee's objective of 2 percent, the economy expanding at a moderate pace, and downside risks somewhat diminished, the federal funds rate will most likely need to rise considerably sooner to prevent the emergence of inflationary pressures. Mr. Lacker continues to prefer to provide forward guidance regarding future Committee policy actions through the inclusion of FOMC participants' projections of the federal funds rate in the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). Monetary Policy Communications As it noted in its statement of principles regarding longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy released in January, the Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. With that goal in mind, participants discussed a range of additional steps that the Committee might take to help the public better understand the linkages between the evolving economic outlook and the Federal Reserve's monetary policy decisions, and thus the conditionality in the Committee's forward guidance. The purpose of the discussion was to explore potentially promising approaches for further enhancing FOMC communications; no decisions on this topic were planned for this meeting and none were taken. Participants discussed ways in which the Committee might include, in its postmeeting statements, additional qualitative or quantitative information that could convey a sense of how the Committee might adjust policy in response to changes in the economic outlook. Participants also discussed whether modifications to the SEP that the Committee releases four times per year could be helpful in clarifying the linkages between the economic outlook and the Committee's monetary policy decisions. In addition, several participants suggested that it could be helpful to discuss at a future meeting some alternative economic scenarios and the monetary policy responses that might be seen as appropriate under each one, in order to clarify the Committee's likely behavior in different contingencies. Finally, participants observed that the Committee introduced several important enhancements to its policy communications over the past year or so; these included the Chairman's postmeeting press conferences as well as changes to the FOMC statement and the SEP. Against this backdrop, some participants noted that additional experience with the changes implemented to date could be helpful in evaluating potential further enhancements.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he preferred to omit the description of the time period over which economic conditions were likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate. He expected that a preemptive tightening of monetary policy would be necessary to prevent an increase in inflation projections or inflation expectations prior to the end of 2014. More broadly, given the inclusion of FOMC participants' projections for the federal funds rate target in the Summary of Economic Projections, he saw no need to provide additional forward guidance in the Committee statement.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he preferred to expand the monetary base by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities rather than through targeted credit programs. Mr. Lacker was fully supportive of the significant expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and the intention to maintain the size of the balance sheet at a high level. However, while he recognized that spreads were elevated and volumes low in many credit markets, he saw no evidence of market failures that made targeted credit programs, including the forthcoming TALF, necessary. Moreover, he was concerned that such programs channel credit away from other worthy borrowers, amount to fiscal policy, would exacerbate moral hazard, and might be hard to unwind. He supported, instead, maintaining the size of the balance sheet at a high level through purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. In his view, such purchases would limit distortions to private credit flows, minimize adverse incentive effects, and maintain a clear distinction between monetary and fiscal policies.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he believed that further tightening was needed to help ensure that core inflation declines to an acceptable rate in coming quarters. Meeting participants briefly reviewed some issues regarding communications and the next steps in their continuing discussion of the topic. At the next FOMC meeting, confirmed for January 30-31, 2007, the Committee intended to consider the role that economic projections and forecasts can play in communicating information. The meeting adjourned at 1:35 p. m.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he believed that further tightening was needed to help ensure that core inflation declines to an acceptable rate in coming quarters. The Committee then continued its discussion of communication issues and considered the advantages and disadvantages of quantifying an inflation objective. Participants stressed that any such step had to be consistent with the statutory objectives for monetary policy. In that regard, it was noted that over time price stability is a prerequisite for maximum employment and moderate long-term interest rates. However, the possible specification of a numerical price objective raised a number of complex and interrelated issues that required considerable further discussion. The Committee reached no decisions on these issues at this meeting, and participants agreed to continue the Committee's review of communication issues at its meeting in January 2007. The meeting adjourned at 1:30 p. m.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he believed that further tightening was needed to bring inflation down more rapidly than would be the case if the policy rate were kept unchanged. Recent data indicated that inflation remained above levels consistent with price stability. Moreover, the upswing in compensation and unit labor costs in the first half of the year indicated that inflation risks were tilted to the upside. Although real growth was likely to be moderate in coming quarters, in his view it was unlikely to be slow enough to bring core inflation down. The meeting adjourned at 1:20 p. m.

Mr. Lacker dissented because he believed that further tightening was needed to bring inflation down more rapidly than would be the case if the policy rate were kept unchanged. The inflation outlook had deteriorated in the intermeeting period; the recent surge in core inflation had persisted and appeared to be broad-based, while the revision of the national income and product accounts indicated a recent upswing in compensation and unit labor costs. Although real growth was likely to be somewhat lower in coming quarters, in his view it was unlikely to moderate by enough to bring core inflation down. He noted, moreover, that real short-term interest rates had fallen in the intermeeting period and were still low relative to rates typically associated with sustained expansions. The Committee then turned to a discussion of the goals and principles that should guide the review of its approaches to policy communications that it had recently undertaken. Participants agreed that communication was important for democratic accountability and could promote the effectiveness of policy. Although considerable strides had been made in FOMC communications over the past ten years or so, participants generally thought that further advances were possible. In that regard, consideration of how the Committee expressed both its economic objectives and its assessments of expected progress toward those objectives was likely to be particularly important. Conveying the degree of uncertainty and conditionality about Committee expectations of future developments was seen as a major challenge. It was recognized that communications should support appropriate decisionmaking, including respect for the diversity of views that contributed to good decisions. Participants agreed to continue the Committee�s review of communications issues at the FOMC meeting in October. The meeting adjourned at 3:05 p. m.